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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Natu re Of The Case
William Fifer appeals from the district court's order affirming the judgment
entered by the magistrate upon Fifer's guilty plea to driving under the influence.
Fifer claims error in the denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A concerned citizen called 911 after encountering an elderly motorist who
looked like his car was stalled. (Exhibit, Track 1.)

The caller, who identified

herself as Becky, told dispatch that the driver was an elderly man who may have
been intoxicated but was, in any event, quite confused and possibly "having
symptoms of a stroke or something." (Id.) Becky offered the driver assistance
but he declined, stating he just did not feel like driving. (Id.) After Becky offered
to help, the driver proceeded to a nearby Walgreens and parked his car at which
time Becky called 911. (Id.) Becky provided dispatch with a description of the
car (a blue Camaro), a partial license plate, and the location of the Camaro. (Id.)
Becky also provided dispatch with a phone number where she could be reached.
(Id.)
Officer Jack Wade was dispatched to investigate. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.7, L.7
- p.8, L.19; Exhibit 1, Track 2.) When Officer Wade arrived at Walgreens, he
saw a blue Camaro with an elderly male driver starting to exit the Walgreens'
parking lot. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.17-25.) Officer Wade activated his overhead
lights and stopped in front of the Camaro. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-9.) Officer
Wade made contact with the driver who identified himself as Fifer and asked if
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"he was okay and if he needed any medical assistance," explaining that dispatch
had received a call from someone who was concerned for his well-being.
(2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-18.)

Fifer "advised that he was okay but as he did

speak," Officer Wade "could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from
the vehicle." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-22.) When asked about the odor of
alcohol, Fifer admitted he had been drinking. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11,
L.1.) Officer Wade subsequently arrested Fifer for driving under the influence
and a breath analysis revealed Fifer's blood alcohol content was .182/.173.
(2/10/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-23; R, p.21.) The state charged Fifer with driving

under the influence, second offense. (R, pp.7, 17-18,20-21.)
Fifer filed a motion to suppress, arguing:
At the time of [his] seizure, Officer Wade's suspicion was based
upon a caller identified only as Becki, indicating a belief that an
elderly man in a blue Camaro seemed intoxicated and was acting
confused. There was no further information provided that would
distinguish the caller as anything other than an anonymous caller
named Becki. There was no artiCUlated facts as to what the elderly
man in the blue Camaro had done to cause the caller to believe the
man was intoxicated. It was only indicated that the man had
declined the caller's offer of help. Upon arrival, Officer Wade did
not observe the blue Camaro engaged in any illegal activity or
anything that might appear to be suspicion of illegal activity.
(R, pp.11-12 (verbatim).) According to Fifer, because Officer Wade "lacked any
facts from which the caller's identity, described only as 'Becki,' [sic] could be
readily ascertained at the time he effectuated the traffic stop," and because
Officer Wade stopped Fifer based solely on Becky's report, there was no
"reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the stop"
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and all evidence obtained after the stop should be excluded as "fruit of the
unlawful seizure." (R., pp.12-13.)
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Fifer acknowledged Becky
was not an anonymous caller, and argued instead that because Becky thought
Fifer was confused rather than intoxicated, Officer Wade had no basis to stop
him. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.16, L.8.) Fifer also argued that Officer Wade
could not stop him under the community caretaker function because he had
already declined assistance from Becky.

(2/10/2011 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14.)

The

magistrate denied Fifer's motion. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.26, L.11 - p.38, L.2.) Fifer
thereafter pled guilty and the magistrate entered judgment. (R., pp.24, 28.)
Fifer filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court (R., pp.29-32), and
the district court affirmed (R., pp.42-43). Fifer timely appealed to this Court. (R.,
pp.45-47.) 1

Execution of Fifer's judgment has been suspended pending appeal. (R., pp.3839,48-53.)
1

3

ISSUES
Fifer states the issues on appeal as:
1)
Whether Appellant was seized for Fourth Amendment
scrutiny?
2)
Whether the warrantless seizure was lawful under the
caretaker function exception to the warrant requirement?
3)
Whether law enforcement had reasonable articulable
suspicion a crime was being committed to effectuate a traffic stop?
(Brief of Appellant, p.2.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Should this Court decline to consider Fifer's argument on appeal as the
record does not indicate he preserved this issue for appeal by entering a
conditional guilty plea? Alternatively, has Fifer failed to establish the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate's denial of Fifer's suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Decline To Consider Fifer's Claim On Appeal Because The
Record Does Not Reflect He Entered A Conditional Guilty Plea, Reserving His
Right To Appeal The Denial Of His Suppression Motion; Alternatively, Fifer Has
Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate's Denial
Of Fifer's Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Fifer asserts error in the denial of his suppression motion, arguing his

detention was

improper under the community caretaking function

and,

alternatively, there was no evidence of "criminal behavior" justifying the stop.
(Brief of Appellant, pp.2-6.)

The Court should decline to consider Fifer's

argument because Fifer waived any right he may have had to appeal the denial
of his suppression motion when he entered what appears from the record to be
an unconditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence. Even if Fifer can
produce evidence that he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion, application of the relevant legal principles to the facts shows
the district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's order denying Fifer's
suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008». The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
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and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).2
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

This Court Should Decline To Consider Fifer's Claim On Appeal Because
It Was Not Preserved By A Conditional Guilty Plea
It

is

well-settled

that

"[a]

valid

plea

of guilty,

voluntarily

and

understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses,
whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings."

State v. Ak-Kotrani,

141 Idaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (quoting Clark v. State, 92 Idaho
827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969)). However, a defendant may preserve such
defects or issues by entering a conditional plea of guilty which reserves, in
writing, the right to review any specified adverse ruling. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at
69, 106 P.3d at 395 (citing LC.R. 11(a)(2)). There is no evidence in the record
2 Fifer cites an outdated standard of review applicable to review of an appellate
decision by a district court. (Brief of Appellant, p.2 (citing State v. Pick, 124
Idaho 601 (Ct. App. 1993).) The Idaho Supreme Court clarified the correct
standard in Losser, supra, as set forth above.
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that Fifer entered a conditional guilty plea as allowed by Rule 11. The change of
plea form only indicates Fifer entered a plea of guilty, which was accepted by the
magistrate. (R., p.24 (attached hereto as Appendix A).) There is no other written
document in the record, nor any transcript, indicating Fifer's plea was conditional
or specifying that he reserved his right to challenge the denial of his suppression
motion.

Based upon the record before this Court, Fifer's plea can only be

deemed conditional by assumption, which is contrary to the "in writing"
requirement of Rule 11 (a)(2) and contrary to appellate practice generally.
Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider Fifer's claim of error.

D.

Even If Fifer Can Prove That He Reserved His Right To Challenge The
Denial Of His Suppression Motion By Entering A Conditional Guilty Plea,
He Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His Suppression
Motion
Fifer asserts error in the denial of his suppression motion, arguing his

detention was unsupported by either the community caretaking function or
reasonable articulable suspicion. (Brief of Appellant, pp.2-6.) Fifer is incorrect.
Fifer's detention was justified based upon the information Becky provided to
dispatch, which provided Officer Wade reason to believe that Fifer may be in
need of medical assistance, if not reasonable articulable suspicion to believe
Fifer was driving under the influence.
"[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the

Fourth Amendment is

'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions."
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). The
community caretaking function is one such exception and it involves the duty of
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the police to help individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate
assistance. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752,754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997)
(citing In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401(1988)).

"Community

caretaking is based on the notion that police serve to ensure the safety and
welfare of the citizenry at-large." State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 304, 141 P.3d
1166,1173 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted).

"Among the core community

caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to search for missing
persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency
services."

lsL

at 302, 141 P.3d at 1171 (citation omitted).

"In analyzing

community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the
circumstances test."

Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (citation

omitted). "The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is
whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all surrounding
circumstances."

lsL,

130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v.

Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995)) (brackets
omitted).

Reasonableness

circumstances.

lsL

is

assessed

based

on

the totality of the

"The reasonableness of an officer's action in pursuit of

community caretaking is to be "[t]ested upon practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable persons act. ... " State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824,
54 P.3d 464,467 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817,818,
748 P.2d 401, 402 (1988)). ''There must be a sufficient public interest furthered
by the detention to outweigh the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the
privacy of the detained citizen."

Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824, 54 P.3d at 467.
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(citation omitted).

Further, "in order for the community caretaking function

analysis to apply, an officer must possess a subjective believe that an individual
is in need of immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an
expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime." State v. Deccio, 136
Idaho 442, 445,34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing cases).
Application of the foregoing principles supports the district court's and
magistrate's conclusion that Officer Wade acted well-within the scope of the
community caretaking function.

Officer Wade testified that he responded to

Fifer's location after "Becky reported that this elderly male appeared to be
confused and having possibly a medical condition." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-7.)
Upon making contact with Fifer, Office Wade "asked him if he was okay and if he
needed any medical assistance" and advised Fifer they "had received a call that
he was having an issue and the lady who called was concerned for his well
being." (2/10/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-18.) Officer Wade's actions were reasonable
and fell squarely within one of the "core community caretaking activities." Cutler,
143 Idaho at 304,141 P.3d at 1173; Clayton, 113 Idaho 817,748 P.2d 401, is
analogous to the circumstances presented in this case.
In Clayton, an officer "observed a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar"
in the "early morning hours."

~

at 818, 748 P.2d at 402.

The vehicle was

running, with the headlights on, and a man, later identified as Clayton, was sitting
in the driver's seat, slumped over the steering wheel.

~

The officer "decided to

approach the vehicle to determine whether the person was in need of medical
attention, asleep or intoxicated."

~

The officer "opened the driver's side door,
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reached in, turned the motor off, and took possession of the keys." 1.9.:. After
several attempts at arousing Clayton, "Clayton awoke and began talking," but
was incoherent. 1.9.:. Ultimately, the officer arrested Clayton for driving under the
influence. 1.9.:.
On appeal, the Court considered whether the officer's "conduct in
performing his investigation complied with Clayton's fourth amendment right to
be from unreasonable searches and seizures." Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818, 748
P.2d at 402.

The Court concluded it did, "not[ing] that the officer acted

reasonably in investigating the situation." 1.9.:. The Court stated:

"When [the

officer] observed the vehicle with its motor running, lights on, and the driver
slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate as stated in
Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441,93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706
(1973)." Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818, 748 P.2d at 402. "Tested upon practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, th[e] situation
[confronting the officer fell] outside the boundaries of normal conduct." 1.9.:. "The
driver could have been hurt or sick, and in need of medical attention.

[The

officer] acted prudently and satisfied his caretaking function when investigating
[Clayton's] vehicle." 1.9.:.
Cutler also provides an analogous factual scenario. In Cutler, an officer
was dispatched to a parking lot where a man was found incoherent and seated in
the driver's seat of his car, which was parked haphazardly in front of a closed
store.

143 Idaho at 300, 141 P.3d at 1169. Medical personnel were already

there when the officer arrived and reported that although "Cutler was extremely
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lethargic," he "did not appear to need medical assistance."

.!sL

The officer

nevertheless remained on scene and, after "the medical personnel moved away
from Cutler's vehicle, the officer observed a handgun on the ledge between the
driver's seat and the doorsill."

~

The officer removed the gun, determined it

was unloaded, and removed Cutler from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs
for "safety purposes."

~

A subsequent frisk for additional weapons uncovered

two pocket knives and a loaded magazine for the gun.
searched

Cutler's

car

for

additional

methamphetamine and paraphernalia .

weapons

.!sL

The officer then

whereupon

he

found

.!sL

Cutler complained that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment.
Cutler, 143 Idaho at 301, 141 P.3d at 1170. The Court of Appeals disagreed,
concluding the officer's actions were reasonable and justified as part of the
officer's community caretaking function. The Court reasoned:
The officer's testimony established that he was motivated by
his genuine concern for Cutler's welfare. Following the frisk of
Cutler for weapons, the officer knew that, in addition to the
handgun, Cutler possessed its ammunition and two pocket knives.
In light of Cutler's condition, it was reasonable for the officer to
believe that it may have been unsafe to leave Cutler in control of a
vehicle, a handgun with ammunition, and two knives. Further,
Cutler's privacy interest had already been compromised to the
extent of the emergency medical personnel's intrusion. That
intrusion was minimally exceeded by the officer's decision to remain
at the scene and ascertain whether further assistance was needed.
Therefore, the public interest in preventing the type of harm that
could result from improper handling of a motor vehicle or firearm
justified a brief detention to ascertain whether Cutler needed
transportation, was gravely disabled due to mental illness,
presented a danger to himself or others, or simply needed to rest.
Cutler, 143 Idaho at 303, 141 P.3d at 1172
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As in Clayton and Cutler, it was entirely appropriate for Officer Wade to
detain Fifer for the purpose of determining whether he required medical aid or
assistance in arranging for an alternative mode of transportation.

As the

magistrate noted, the community caretaking function did not require Officer Wade
to allow Fifer to drive away despite his reported impairment and wait to see if he
had a suspicious driving pattern, or even an accident. (2/10/2011 Tr., p.35, L.23
- p.36, L.4.)

See,~,

Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398, 401 (206) ("it would serve no

purpose to require [the officers] to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response
while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence"). Indeed, if that were
the case, the community caretaking would be irrelevant because the officer
WOUld, at that point, have reasonable articulable suspicion if not probable cause
to detain Fifer.

Thus, the district court correctly agreed with the magistrate's

conclusion that suppression was not required. (12/14/2011 Tr., p.36, Ls.11-19.)
Although not entirely clear, it appears Fifer is asserting that the community
caretaking function does not apply because there was no "emergency."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.)

In support, Fifer argues:

"Although the caller

indicated the driver seemed confused and commented she hoped he was not
having a stroke, it clearly did not rise to the level of an emergency" because
"[n]either the caller's tone nor her own actions evidenced a belief that this was an
emergency." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) At best, Fifer argues, Becky's call was "a
request for a welfare check on a person parked in their [sic] car and not an
emergency requiring law enforcement to seize the person and prevent them [sic]
from driving." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This argument is flawed both legally and
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factually.

Legally, the community caretaking function does not require an

"emergency" before a detention is justified.

As previously noted, "the core

community caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to search for
missing persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency
services." Cutler, 143 Idaho at 302, 141 P.3d at 1171.

The emergency aid

doctrine is just one aspect encompassed within the community caretaking
function, not a necessary prerequisite to application of the community caretaking
rationale to a given set of facts. See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 295, 62
P.3d 214, 219 (2003) (noting that Idaho "treats the emergency aid doctrine within
the community care-taking function exception").
Fifer's claim also fails as a factual matter.

Becky's act of calling 911

certainly suggests she viewed something about the situation as emergent.
Regardless, whether Becky viewed the situation as an "emergency" or just one
appropriate for intervention for the purpose of checking on Fifer's welfare, Officer
Wade's response was constitutionally permissible.
Fifer also argues that, aside from the allegedly improper application of the
community caretaking function in the denial of his suppression motion, the
magistrate also erred in finding reasonable articulable suspicion to justify Fifer's
detention. 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Although the state submits that this Court
need not address the finding of reasonable articulable suspicion given the correct
application of the community caretaking function, Fifer is incorrect in his assertion

The district court did not address this basis for the stop, stating a preference for
"focus[ing] on the community caretaking function" because, in the district court's
view, "it's a little clearer ... whether there was a justification." (12/14/2011 Tr.,
p.33, Ls.8-18.)
3
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that the information provided to Officer Wade was insufficient to justify a
detention to confirm or dispel whether Fifer was an impaired driver.
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted).

Under Terry, an investigative detention must be

supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991).

The

"reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408,
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause.

Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951.

Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Van Dorne,
139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). Although a series of facts
may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warrant further
investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42
P.3d 706,710 (Ct. App. 2001).
Becky initially advised dispatch that Fifer may be driving under the
influence, and she identified specific actions she observed that would be
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consistent with that impression.

(Exhibit, Track 1.) This information provided

reasonable articulable suspicion that Fifer may be driving under the influence.
Fifer claims otherwise relying on Becky's later statement during the 911 call that
she did not think he was intoxicated, but maybe just confused. (Exhibit, Track 1.)
Becky's "conclusion" did not, however, require Officer Wade to reject the
possibility that Fifer was driving under the influence. Further, even if there was a
lack of reasonable suspicion of intoxication, Becky's report of Fifer's confusion
gave Officer Wade reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Fifer was driving in
an inattentive manner due to some other condition. A brief detention to confirm
or dispel any suspicion regarding Fifer's reported inability to drive was
constitutional.
Fifer has failed to demonstrate Officer Wade acted unreasonably in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by detaining him to ascertain whether he
needed assistance or, alternatively, whether he was too impaired to drive. Fifer
has therefore failed to demonstrate error in the district court's decision affirming
the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Because there is no indication Fifer entered a conditional guilty plea
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, this Court
should decline to consider Fifer's claim on appeal. Alternatively, Fifer has failed
to show error in the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of his
motion to suppress.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2012.

JES
Dep
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Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of September, 2012, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MATIHEW RaKER
LOVAN RaKER & ROUNDS,P.C.
717 S. Kimball, Suite 200
Caldwell,lD 83605

Dep t Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

•

•

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
CHANGE OF PLEA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff
-vsWILLIAM FIFER
Defendant.

oCorrected
True Name
Name:
APPEARANCES:
I:8l Defendant
[8J Defendant's Attorney Matthew Roker
Other

) Case No. CR-2010-32901-C
)
) Date: 3/21/2011
)
) Judge: NAFTZ
)
) Recording: MAG 5 (1:14-1:24)
)

I:8l Prosecutor Elizabeth Allen

o Interpreter

o

PROCEEDINGS:
0 THE STATE [8J DEFENSE COUNSEL
ADVISED
[8J Defendant to plead guilty to the charges set forth in the Complaint in case number(s) CR-201 0-32901-C.
charges to be amended as follows: _ _
Defendant to plead guilty to amended charges.
State will move to dismiss
.
Charge to be amended to
if defendant returns to Sentencing with proof of _ _,

o
o

o
o

==-

U

Standard First Offense Recommendation

U

Credit Time Served _ _

THE COURT ORDERED CHARGES
amended as set forth in case(s) _ _.
dismissed.
0 to be dIsmissed at sentencing in case(s) _ _.

o

o

THE COURT DETERMINED DEFENDANT
waived appearance and counsel was authorized to plead in Defendant's behalf.
[8J was entering the plea freely and voluntarily and understood the consequences of pleading gUilty.
[8J understood the Court was not a party to, nor bound by, the plea negotiations.

o

[8J PL
OF GUlLTV entered by Defendant to Driving Under the Influence 2nd Offense
l:8J accepted,
Alcohol evaluation ordered.
0 Drug evaluation ordered. 0 Domestic Battery eval. ordered.
l:8J Misdemeanor PSI
0 Anger Evaluation ordered
[8JSENTENCING SET: April 14, 2011 at 1:30 pm before Judge Schiller.
CUSTODY:
Released on written citation promise to appear,
Released on own recognizance. (O.R.)
Released to pre-trial release officer.

o
o
o

[8J Released on bond previously posted,

o Remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
o Bail set at $ _ .

OTHER: _ _.

Cf!J/JJ1Am 0

-~-----H---+-t_---J' Deputy Clerk

CHANGE OF PLEA
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